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Empirical evidence shows that observed macroeconomic fundamentals have little 
explanatory power for nominal exchange rates (the exchange rate determination 
puzzle). On the other hand, the recent \microstructure approach to exchange rates" has 
shown that most exchange rate volatility at short to medium horizons is related to 
order flow. In this paper we introduce symmetric information dispersion about future 
fundamentals in a dynamic rational expectations model in order to explain these 
stylized facts. Consistent with the evidence the model implies that (i) observed 
fundamentals account for little of exchange rate volatility in the short to medium run, 
(ii) over long horizons the exchange rate is closely related to observed fundamentals, 
(iii) exchange rate changes are a weak predictor of future fundamentals, and (iv) the 
exchange rate is closely related to order flow over both short and long horizons. 
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 I Introduction
The poor explanatory power of existing theories of the nominal exchange rate is
most likely the major weakness of international macroeconomics. Meese and Ro-
go￿ [1983] and the subsequent literature have found that a random walk predicts
exchange rates better than macroeconomic models in the short run. Lyons [2001]
refers to the weak explanatory power of macroeconomic fundamentals as the \ex-
change rate determination puzzle".1 This puzzle is less acute for long-run exchange
rate movements, since there is extensive evidence of a much closer relationship be-
tween exchange rates and fundamentals at horizons of two to four years (e.g., see
Mark [1995]). Recent evidence from the microstructure approach to exchange rates
suggests that investor heterogeneity might play a key role in explaining exchange
rate ￿uctuations. In particular, Evans and Lyons [2002a] show that most short-
run exchange rate volatility is related to order ￿ow, which in turn is associated
with investor heterogeneity.2 Since these features are not present in existing the-
ories, a natural suspect for the failure of current models to explain exchange rate
movements is the standard hypothesis of a representative agent.
The goal of this paper is to present an alternative to the representative agent
model that can explain the exchange rate determination puzzle and the evidence
on order ￿ow. We introduce heterogeneous information into a standard dynamic
monetary model of exchange rate determination. There is a continuum of investors
who di￿er in two respects. First, they have symmetrically dispersed information
about future macroeconomic fundamentals.3 Second, they face di￿erent exchange
rate risk exposure associated with non-asset income. This exposure is private infor-
mation and leads to hedge trades whose aggregate is unobservable. Our main ￿nd-
ing is that information heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate from observed
1See Cheung et.al. [2005] for more recent evidence. The exchange rate determination puzzle
is part of a broader set of exchange rate puzzles that Obstfeld and Rogo￿ [2001] have called the
\exchange rate disconnect puzzle". This also includes the lack of feedback from the exchange
rate to the macro economy and the excess volatility of exchange rates (relative to fundamentals).
2See also Bj￿nnes et al. [2005], Froot and Ramadorai [2005], Evans and Lyons [2002b] and
Hau et al. [2002].
3We know from extensive survey evidence that investors have di￿erent views about the macro-
economic outlook. There is also evidence that exchange rate expectations di￿er substantially
across investors. See Chionis and MacDonald [2002], Ito [1990], Elliott and Ito [1999], and
MacDonald and Marsh [1996].
1macroeconomic fundamentals in the short run, while there is a close relationship
in the long run. At the same time there is a close link between the exchange rate
and order ￿ow over all horizons.
Our modeling approach integrates several strands of literature. First, it has
in common with most of the existing (open economy) macro literature that we
adopt a fully dynamic general equilibrium model, leading to time-invariant second
moments. Second, it has in common with the noisy rational expectations literature
in ￿nance that the asset price (exchange rate) aggregates private information of
individual investors, with unobserved shocks preventing average private signals
from being fully revealed by the price. The latter are modeled endogenously as
hedge trades in our model.4 Third, it has in common with the microstructure
literature of the foreign exchange market that private information is transmitted
to the market through order ￿ow.5
Most models in the noisy rational expectations literature and microstructure
literature are static or two-period models.6 This makes them ill-suited to address
the disconnect between asset prices and fundamentals, which has a dynamic di-
mension since the disconnect is much stronger at short horizons. Even the few
dynamic rational expectation models in the ￿nance literature cannot be applied in
our context. Wang [1993, 1994] develops an in￿nite horizon noisy rational expec-
tations model with a hierarchical information structure. There are only two types
of investors, one of which can fully observe the variables a￿ecting the equilibrium
asset price. We believe that it is more appropriate to consider cases where no
class of investors has superior information and where there is broader dispersion
of information. Several papers make a step in this direction by examining sym-
metrically dispersed information in a multi-period model, but they only examine
an asset with a single payo￿ at a terminal date.7
4Some recent papers in the exchange rate literature have introduced exogenous noise in the
foreign exchange market. However, they do not consider information dispersion about future
macro fundamentals. Examples are Hau [1998], Jeanne and Rose [2002], Devereux and Engel
[2002], Kollman [2005], and Mark and Wu [1998].
5See Lyons [2001] for an overview of this literature.
6See Brunnermeier [2001] for an overview.
7See He and Wang [1995], Vives [1995], Foster and Viswanathan [1996], Allen et al. [2005], or
Brennan and Cao [1997]. The latter assume that private information is symmetrically dispersed
among agents within a country, while there is also asymmetric information between countries.
2For the dynamic dimension of our paper, we rely on the important paper by
Townsend [1983]. Townsend analyzed a business cycle model with symmetrically
dispersed information. As is the case in our model, the solution exhibits in￿nitely
higher order expectations (expectations of other agents’ expectations).8 We adapt
Townsend’s solution procedure to our model. The only application to asset pricing
we are aware of is Singleton [1987], who applies Townsend’s method to a model
for government bonds with a symmetric information structure.9
Another feature of our paper is the explicit modeling of order ￿ow in a general
equilibrium model. This should help giving a theoretical structure for empirical
work. We show for example how order ￿ow precedes prices and thus conveys
information. To derive order ￿ow, we take a di￿erent perspective on the equilib-
rium mechanism. Typically, the equilibrium price of a competitive noisy rational
expectation model is seen as determined by a Walrasian auctioneer. However,
the equilibrium can also be interpreted as the outcome of an order-driven auction
market, whereby market orders based on private information hit an outstanding
limit order book. This characterization resembles the electronic trading system
that nowadays dominates the interbank foreign exchange market. As is common
in the theoretical literature, we de￿ne limit orders as orders that are conditional
on public information and the (yet unknown) exchange rate. Limit orders provide
liquidity to the market. Market orders take liquidity from the market and are
associated with private information. Order ￿ow is equal to net market orders. Not
surprisingly, the weak relationship in the model between short-run exchange rate
￿uctuations and publicly observed fundamentals is closely mirrored by the close
8Subsequent contributions have been mostly technical, solving the same model as in Townsend
[1983] with alternative methods. See Kasa [2000] and Sargent [1991]. Probably as a result of the
technical di￿culty in solving these models, the macroeconomics literature has devoted relatively
little attention to heterogeneous information in the last two decades. This contrasts with the
1970s where, following Lucas [1972], there had been active research on rational expectations and
heterogeneous information (e.g., see King, 1982). Recently, information issues in the context of
price rigidity have again been brought to the forefront in contributions by Woodford [2003] and
Mankiw and Reis [2002].
9In Singleton’s model there is no information dispersion about the payo￿ structure on the
assets (in this case coupons on government bonds), but there is private information about whether
noise trade is transitory or persistent. The uncertainty is resolved after two periods. Hussman
[1992] and Kasa et al. [2004] also study dynamic asset pricing models with in￿nitely higher order
expectations, but do not adopt a symmetrically dispersed information structure.
3relationship between exchange rate ￿uctuations and order ￿ow.10
The dynamic implications of the model for the relationship between the ex-
change rate, observed fundamentals and order ￿ow can be understood as follows.
In the short run, rational confusion plays an important role in disconnecting the
exchange rate from observed fundamentals. Investors do not know whether an
increase in the exchange rate is driven by an improvement in average private sig-
nals about future fundamentals or an increase in unobserved hedge trades. This
implies that unobserved hedge trades have an ampli￿ed e￿ect on the exchange
rate since they are confused with changes in average private signals about future
fundamentals.11 We show that a small amount of hedge trades can become the
dominant source of exchange rate volatility when information is heterogeneous,
while it has practically no e￿ect on the exchange rate when investors have com-
mon information. Moreover, our numerical simulations show that these e￿ects are
quantitatively consistent with empirical evidence.
In the long run there is a close relationship between the exchange rate, ob-
served fundamentals and cumulative order ￿ow. First, rational confusion gradu-
ally dissipates as investors learn more about future fundamentals.12 The impact
of unobserved hedge trades on the equilibrium price therefore gradually weakens,
leading to a closer long-run relationship between the exchange rate and observed
fundamentals. Second, when the fundamental has a permanent component the
exchange rate and cumulative order ￿ow are closely linked in the long run. Private
information about permanent future changes in the fundamental is transmitted to
10In recent work closely related to ours, Evans and Lyons [2004] also introduce microstructure
features in a dynamic general equilibrium model in order to shed light on exchange rate puzzles.
There are three important di￿erences in comparison to our approach. First, they adopt a quote-
driven market, while we model an order-driven auction market. Second, they assume that all
investors within one country have the same information, while there is asymmetric information
across countries. Third, their model is not in the noisy rational expectations tradition.
11The basic idea of rational confusion can already be found in the noisy rational expectation
literature. For example, Gennotte and Leland [1990] and Romer [1993] argued that such rational
confusion played a critical role in amplifying non-informational trade during the stock-market
crash of October 19, 1987.
12Another recent paper on exchange rate dynamics where learning plays an important role is
Gourinchas and Tornell [2004]. In that paper, in which there is no investor heterogeneity, agents
learn about the nature of interest rate shocks (transitory or persistent), but there is an irrational
misperception about the second moments in interest rate forecasts that never goes away.
4the market through order ￿ow, so that order ￿ow has a permanent e￿ect on the
exchange rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
model and solution method. Section III considers a special case of the model in
order to develop intuition for our key results. Section IV discusses the implications
of the dynamic features of the model. Section V presents numerical results based
on the general dynamic model and Section VI concludes.
II A Monetary Model with Information Disper-
sion
II.A Basic Setup
Our model contains the three basic building blocks of the standard monetary model
of exchange rate determination: (i) money market equilibrium, (ii) purchasing
power parity, and (iii) interest rate arbitrage. We modify the standard mone-
tary model by assuming incomplete and dispersed information across investors.
Before describing the precise information structure, we ￿rst derive a general solu-
tion to the exchange rate under heterogeneous information, in which the exchange
rate depends on higher order expectations of future macroeconomic fundamentals.
This generalizes the standard equilibrium exchange rate equation that depends on
common expectations of future fundamentals.
Both observable and unobservable fundamentals a￿ect the exchange rate. The
observable fundamental is the ratio of money supplies. We assume that investors
have heterogeneous information about future money supplies. The unobservable
fundamental takes the form of an aggregate hedge against non-asset income in
the demand for foreign exchange. This unobservable element introduces noise in
the foreign exchange market in the sense that it prevents investors from infer-
ring average expectations about future money supplies from the price.13 This
trade also a￿ects the risk premium in the interest rate arbitrage condition. No-
tice that the unobserved hedge trades are true aggregate fundamentals that drive
13For alternative modeling of ’noise’ from rational behavior, see Wang [1994], Dow and Gorton
[1995], and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam [1992].
5the equilibrium exchange rate, but they are typically not called fundamentals by
macroeconomists because they cannot be directly observed.




t + st (1)
Local currency prices are in logs and st is the log of the nominal exchange rate
(home per foreign currency).
There is a continuum of investors in both countries on the interval [0,1]. We
assume that there are overlapping generations of agents who live for two periods
and make only one investment decision. Before dying investor i passes on his or her
private information to the next investor i born the following period. This myopic
agent setup signi￿cantly simpli￿es the presentation, helps in providing intuition,
and allows us to obtain an exact solution to the model.14
Investors in both economies can invest in four assets: money of their own coun-
try, nominal bonds of both countries with interest rates it and i￿
t, and a technology
with ￿xed real return r that is in in￿nite supply. We assume a small open-economy
setting. The Home country is large and the Foreign country in￿nitesimally small;
variables from the latter are starred. Bond market equilibrium is therefore entirely
determined by investors in the large Home country, on which we will focus. We
also assume that money supply in the large country is constant. It is easy to show
that this implies a constant price level pt in equilibrium, so that it = r. For ease
of notation, we just assume a constant pt. Money supply in the small country is
stochastic.
The wealth wi
t of investors born at time t is given by a ￿xed endowment. At
time t + 1 these investors receive the return on their investments plus income
yi
t+1 from time t + 1 production. We assume that production depends both on
the exchange rate and on real money holdings f mi





t)￿1)=￿, with ￿ > 0.15 The coe￿cient ￿i
t measures the exchange
rate exposure of the non-asset income of investor i. We assume that ￿i
t is time
14See Singleton [1987] for the same setup. In an earlier version of the paper, Bacchetta and van
Wincoop [2003], we also consider an in￿nite-horizon version. While this signi￿cantly complicates
the solution method, numerical results are almost identical.
15By introducing money through production rather than utility we avoid making money de-
mand a function of consumption, which would complicate the solution.
6varying and known only to investor i. This will generate an idiosyncratic hedging
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Ft is invested in foreign bonds and st+1 ￿ st + i￿
t ￿ it is the log-linearized
excess return on investing abroad.
Combining the ￿rst order condition for money holdings with money market
equilibrium in both countries we get








where mt and m￿
t are the logs of domestic and foreign nominal money supply.












where the conditional variance of next period’s exchange rate is ￿2
t, which is the
same for all investors in equilibrium. We focus on equilibria where the conditional
variance of next period’s exchange rate is time-invariant. The hedge against non-
asset income is represented by bi
t = ￿i
t.
We assume that the exchange rate exposure is equal to the average exposure
plus an idiosyncratic term, so that bi
t = bt+"i
t. We consider the limiting case where
the variance of "i
t approaches in￿nity, so that knowing one’s own exchange rate
exposure provides no information about the average exposure. This assumption
is only made for convenience and our results do not qualitatively change when
we assume a ￿nite, but positive, variance of "i
t. The key assumption is that the
aggregate hedge component bt is unobservable. We assume that bt follows an AR(1)
process:





b). While bt is an unobserved fundamental, the assumed autore-
gressive process is known by all agents.
16Here we implicitly assume that st+1 is normally distributed. We will see in section II.D that
the equilibrium exchange rate indeed has a normal distribution.
7II.B Market Equilibrium and Higher Order Expectations




One way to reach equilibrium is to have a Walrasian auctioneer to whom investors
submit their demand schedule bi
Ft. We show below that the same equilibrium
can also be implemented by introducing a richer microstructure in the form of an
order-driven auction market.
Market equilibrium yields the following interest rate arbitrage condition:





where Et is the average rational expectation across all investors. The model is sum-
marized by (1), (2), (3), and (6). Other than the risk premium in the interest rate
arbitrage condition, associated with non-observable trade, these equations are the
standard building blocks of the monetary model of exchange rate determination.
De￿ning the observable fundamental as ft = (mt ￿ m￿
t), in Appendix A we




















t(xt) = xt, E
1




t(xt+k) = EtEt+1:::Et+k￿1(xt+k): (8)
Thus, the exchange rate at time t depends on the fundamental at time t, the
average expectation at t of the fundamental at time t+1, the average expectation
at t of the average expectation at t + 1 of the fundamental at t + 2, etc. The
law of iterated expectations does not apply to average expectations. For example,
EtEt+1(st+2) 6= Et(st+2).17 This is a basic feature of asset pricing under hetero-
geneous expectations: the expectation of other investors’ expectations matters.18
In a dynamic system, this leads to the in￿nite regress problem, as analyzed in
Townsend [1983]: as the horizon goes to in￿nity the dimensionality of the expec-
tation term goes to in￿nity.
17See Allen, Morris, and Shin [2005] and Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a].
18Notice that the higher order expectations are of a dynamic nature, i.e., today’s expectations
of tomorrow’s expectations. This contrasts with most of the literature that considers higher
order expectations in a static context with strategic externalities, e.g., Morris and Shin [2002] or
Woodford [2003].
8II.C The Information Structure
We assume that at time t investors observe all past and current ft, while they
receive private signals about ft+1;:::;ft+T. More precisely, we assume that investors
receive one signal each period about the observable fundamental T periods ahead.
For example, at time t investor i receives a signal
v
i








t is independent from ft+T and other agents’ signals.19 As usual in this




We also assume that the observable fundamental’s process is known by all








where D(L) = d1 + d2L + d3L + ::: and L is the lag operator. Since investors
observe current and lagged values of the fundamental, knowing the process provides
information about the fundamental at future dates.
II.D Solution Method
In order to solve the equilibrium exchange rate there is no need to compute all the
higher order expectations that it depends on. The key equation used in the solution
method is the interest rate arbitrage condition (6), which captures foreign exchange
market equilibrium. It only involves a ￿rst order average market expectation. We
adopt a method of undetermined coe￿cients, conjecturing an equilibrium exchange
rate equation and then verifying that it satis￿es the equilibrium condition (6).
Townsend [1983] adopts a similar method for solving a business cycle model with
higher order expectations.21 Here we provide a brief description of the solution
method, leaving details to Appendix B.
19This implies that each period investors have T signals that are informative about future
observed fundamentals. Note that the analysis could be easily extended to the case where
investors receive a vector of signals each period.
20See Admati [1985] for a discussion.
21The solution method described in Townsend [1983] applies to the model in section 8 of that
paper where the economy-wide average price is observed with noise. Townsend [1983] mistakenly
9We conjecture the following equilibrium exchange rate equation that depends






where A(L) and B(L) are in￿nite order polynomials in the lag operator L. The
errors "iv
t do not enter the exchange rate equation as they average to zero across
investors. Since at time t investors observe the fundamental ft, only the innovations
"f between t + 1 and t + T are unknown. Similarly shocks "b between t ￿ T and t
are unknown. Exchange rates at time t ￿ T and earlier, together with knowledge
of "f at time t and earlier, reveal the shocks "b at time t ￿ T and earlier.22
Investors solve a signal extraction problem for the ￿nite number of unknown
innovations. Both private signals and exchange rates from time t ￿ T + 1 to t
provide information about the unknown innovations. The solution to the signal
extraction problem leads to expectations at time t of the unknowns as a func-
tion of observables, which in turn can be written as a function of the innovations
themselves. One can then compute the average expectation of st+1. Substituting
the result into the interest rate arbitrage condition (6) leads to a new exchange
rate equation. The coe￿cients of the polynomials A(L) and B(L) can then be de-
rived by solving a ￿xed point problem, equating the coe￿cients of the conjectured
exchange rate equation to those in the equilibrium exchange rate equation. Al-
though the lag polynomials are of in￿nite order, for lags longer than T periods the
information dispersion plays no role and an analytical solution to the coe￿cients
is feasible.23
A couple of comments about multiplicity of equilibria are in order. Models with
believed that higher order expectations are also relevant in a two-sector version of the model
where ￿rms observe each other’s prices without noise. Pearlman and Sargent [2005] show that
the equilibrium fully reveals private information in that case.
22Here we implicitly assume that the B(L) polynomial is invertible, which is the case when the
roots of B(L) = 0 are outside the unit circle. This assumption holds for all the parameterizations
of the model considered below. See Appendix B.3 for a discussion.
23In Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2003] we solve the model for the case where investors have
in￿nite horizons. The solution is then complicated by the fact that investors also need to hedge
against changes in expected future returns. This hedge term depends on the in￿nite state space,
which is truncated to obtain an approximate solution. Numerical results are almost identical to
the case of overlapping generations.
10heterogeneous information do not necessarily lead to multiple equilibria.24 Multiple
equilibria can arise when the conditional variance of next period’s asset price is
endogenous, as shown by McCa￿erty and Driskill [1980]. But that applies to both
common knowledge and heterogeneous information models. In the context of our
model the intuition is that a higher conditional variance of next period’s exchange
rate leads to a bigger impact of hedge trades on the exchange rate through the
risk-premium channel, which indeed justi￿es the higher conditional variance. For
the special case T = 1 that we discuss below analytical results can be obtained. It
is easy to check in that case that for a given ￿2 there is a unique solution to the
exchange rate equation. But when allowing for the endogeneity of ￿2 we ￿nd that
there are always two equilibria, a low and a high ￿2 equilibrium.25 For the more
general case where T > 1 we con￿rm numerically that there are two equilibria.26
In Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2003] we show that the high variance equilibrium
is unstable. Our numerical analysis in the paper therefore always focuses on the
low variance equilibrium.
II.E Order Flow
Evans and Lyons [2002a] de￿ne order ￿ow as \the net of buyer-initiated and seller-
initiated orders." While each transaction involves a buyer and a seller, the sign of
the transaction is determined by the initiator of the transaction. The initiator of
a transaction is the trader (either buyer or seller) who acts based on new private
information. In our setup this includes both private information about the future
fundamental and private information that leads to hedge trades. The passive side
of trade varies across models. In a quote-driven dealer market, such as modeled
by Evans and Lyons [2002a], the quoting dealer is on the passive side. The foreign
exchange market has traditionally been characterized as a quote-driven multi-
dealer market, but the recent increase in electronic trading (e.g., EBS) implies
that a majority of interbank trade is done through an auction market. In that case
24DeMarzo and Skiadas [1998] show that the well-known heterogeneous information model of
Grossman [1976] has a unique equilibrium.
25A technical appendix that is available on requests proves these points for T = 1.
26We check this by searching over a very wide space of possible ￿2. There is an equilibrium only
when the conjectured ￿2 is equal to the conditional variance implied by the resulting exchange
rate equation.
11the limit orders are the passive side of transactions and provide liquidity to the
market. The initiated orders are referred to as market orders that are confronted
with the passive outstanding limit order book.
In the standard noisy rational expectations literature the order ￿ow plays no
role, while the asset price conveys information. But how can the price convey
information when the price is unknown at the time asset demand orders are placed?
This is only possible when investors submit demand functions that are conditional
on the price. One can think of those demand functions being submitted to an
implicit auctioneer, who then ￿nds the equilibrium price.
However, there is an alternative interpretation of how the equilibrium price is
set in such models, which connects more closely to the explicit auction market
nature of the present foreign exchange market. Investors submit their demand
functions for foreign bonds in two components, market orders (order ￿ow) and limit
orders. Limit orders depend on available public information and are conditioned
on the exchange rate itself. These are passive orders that are only executed when
confronted with market orders. Market orders are associated with the private
information component of asset demand.27
To be more precise, let Ii
t be the private information set available to agent i
at time t and I
p
t the public information set available to all investors at the time
market orders are submitted. The exchange rate st is not part of the information
set at the time orders are placed, but investors can submit limit orders that are
conditional on the exchange rate. After computing the expected exchange rate
next period as a function of the information set and of st, it is easy to show that
there are parameters ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 such that the demand for foreign bonds can
27One way to formalize this separation into limit and market orders is to introduce foreign
exchange dealers to whom investors delegate price discovery. Dealers are simply a veil, passing
on customer orders to the interdealer market, where price discovery takes place. Customers
submit their demand functions to dealers through a combination of limit and market orders.
Dealers can place both types of orders in the interdealer electronic auction market, but need to
place the limit orders before customer orders are known. If we introduce an in￿nitesimal trading
cost in the interdealer market that is proportional to the volume of executed trades, dealers will
submit limit orders that are equal to the expected customer orders based on public information.
The unexpected customer orders are associated with private information and are submitted as
market orders to the interdealer market. This formalization also connects well to the existing






t + ￿2st + ￿3I
i
t (12)
Market orders are de￿ned as the pure private information component of asset










Note that we do not condition on the exchange rate st since it is not known
at the time the market orders are placed; only limit orders can be conditioned
on the exchange rate. Limit order consist of the remaining component of asset




t ) = ￿4I
p
t , limit orders are
(￿1 + ￿4)I
p
t + ￿2st (14)
The aggregate order ￿ow is ￿xt =
R 1
0 ￿xi
tdi. Imposing market equilibrium
R 1
0 bi
Ftdi = 0, which is equivalent to the sum of aggregate order ￿ow and limit










When demand shifts are only due to public information arrival, the order ￿ow
term is zero and executed limit orders will be zero as well. A shift in demand
can therefore bring about a change in the exchange rate without any actual trade.
Only shifts in demand due to private information lead to trade.
Since st￿1 is part of I
p
t , it follows that there are parameters ￿1 and ￿2 such that
￿st = ￿1I
p
t + ￿2￿xt (16)
Equation (16) is important. It breaks down changes in exchange rates associated
with public information (the ￿rst term) and private information (the second term).
The two terms are orthogonal since order ￿ow is de￿ned to be orthogonal to public
information. This also implies that a regression of the change in the exchange rate
on order ￿ow will lead to an unbiased estimate of ￿2 and an unbiased measure of
the contribution of order ￿ow to exchange rate volatility. There is no simultaneity
bias in such a regression. Causality runs from quantity (order ￿ow) to price (the
13exchange rate), not the other way around. Order ￿ow decisions are made before
the equilibrium exchange rate is known. This di￿ers from the implicit auctioneer
interpretation, where quantities and prices are set simultaneously by the auction-
eer. We want to emphasize though that the equilibrium exchange rate is the same
under these two interpretations of price setting. The explicit auction market inter-
pretation simply has the advantage to connect more closely to existing institutions
and to evidence on the relationship between order ￿ow and exchange rate.
III Model Implications: A Special Case
In this section we examine the special case where T = 1, which has a relatively
simple solution. This example is used to illustrate how information heterogeneity
disconnects the exchange rate from observed macroeconomic fundamentals, while
establishing a close relationship between the exchange rate and order ￿ow.
One aspect that simpli￿es the solution for T = 1 is that higher order expec-
tations are the same as ￿rst order expectations. This can be seen as follows.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a] show that higher order expectations are equal
to ￿rst order expectations plus average expectations of future market expecta-
tional errors. For example, the second order expectation of ft+2 can be written as
E
2
tft+2 = Etft+2 + Et(Et+1ft+2 ￿ ft+2). When T = 1 investors do not expect the
market to make expectational errors next period. An investor may believe at time
t that he has di￿erent private information about ft+1 than others. However, that
information is no longer relevant next period since ft+1 is observed at t + 1.28
While not critical, we make the further simplifying assumptions in this section
that bt and ft are i.i.d., i.e., ￿b = 0 and ft = "
f
t. Replacing higher order with ￿rst















Only the average expectation of ft+1 appears. We have replaced ￿2
t with ￿2 since
we will focus on the stochastic steady state where second order moments are time-
invariant.
28See Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a] for a more detailed discussion of this point.
14III.A Solving the Model with Heterogenous Information
When T = 1 investors receive private signals vi
t about ft+1, as in (9). Therefore
the average expectation Etft+1 in (17) depends on the average of private signals,
which is equal to ft+1 itself. This implies that the exchange rate st depends on
ft+1, so that the exchange rate becomes itself a source of information about ft+1.
However, the exchange rate is not fully revealing as it also depends on unobserved
aggregate hedge trades bt. To determine the information signal about ft+1 provided





ft + ￿fft+1 + ￿bbt (18)








where e st = st￿ 1
1+￿ft is the "adjusted" exchange rate. The variance of the error of
this signal is (￿b=￿f)2￿2
b. Consequently, investor i infers Ei
tft+1 from three sources
of information: i) the distribution of ft+1; ii) the signal vi
t; iii) the adjusted exchange
rate (i.e., (19)). Since errors in each of these signals have a normal distribution,
the projection theorem implies that Ei
tft+1 is given by a weighted average of the






t + ￿se st=￿f
D
(20)
where ￿v = 1=￿2
v, ￿s = 1=(￿b=￿f)2￿2
b, ￿f = 1=￿2
f, and D = 1=var(ft+1) = ￿v +
￿f + ￿s. For the exchange rate signal, the precision is complex and depends both
on ￿2
b and ￿b=￿f, the latter being endogenous. By substituting (20) into (17) and
using the fact that
R 1
0 vi














where z = 1=(1 ￿ ￿
(1+￿)2
￿s
￿fD) > 1. Equation (21) con￿rms the conjecture (18).
Equating the coe￿cients on ft+1 and bt in (21) to respectively ￿f and ￿b yields
implicit solutions to these parameters.
15We will call z the magni￿cation factor: the equilibrium coe￿cient of bt in (21)
is the direct e￿ect of bt in (17) multiplied by z. This magni￿cation can be ex-
plained by rational confusion. When the exchange rate changes, investors do not
know whether this is driven by hedge trades or by information about future macro-
economic fundamentals by other investors. Therefore, they always revise their ex-
pectations of fundamentals when the exchange rate changes (equation (20)). This
rational confusion magni￿es the impact of the unobserved hedge trades on the ex-
change rate. More speci￿cally, from (17) and (20), we can see that a change in bt
has two e￿ects on st. First, it a￿ects st directly in (17) through the risk-premium
channel. Second, this direct e￿ect is magni￿ed by an increase in Etft+1 from (20).
The magni￿cation factor can be written as29
z = 1 +
￿s
￿v (22)
The magni￿cation factor therefore depends on the precision of the exchange rate
signal relative to the precision of the private signal. The better the quality of the
exchange rate signal, the more weight is given to the exchange rate in forming
expectations of ft+1, and therefore the larger the magni￿cation of the unobserved
hedge trades.
Figure 1 shows the impact of two key parameters on magni￿cation. A rise
in the private signal variance ￿2
v at ￿rst raises magni￿cation and then lowers it.
Two opposite forces are at work. First, an increase in ￿2
v reduces the precision ￿v
of the private signal. Investors therefore give more weight to the exchange rate
signal, which enhances the magni￿cation factor. Second, a rise in ￿2
v implies less
information about next period’s fundamental and therefore a lower weight of ft+1
in the exchange rate. This reduces the precision ￿s of the exchange rate signal,
which reduces the magni￿cation factor. For large enough ￿2
v this second factor
dominates. The magni￿cation factor is therefore largest for intermediate values
of the quality of private signals. Figure 1 also shows that a higher variance ￿2
b of
hedging shocks always reduces magni￿cation. It reduces the precision ￿s of the
exchange rate signal.








￿fD) and solve for z.
16III.B Disconnect from Observed Fundamentals
In order to precisely identify the channels through which information heterogeneity
disconnects the exchange rate from observed fundamentals, we now compare the
model to a benchmark with identically informed investors. The benchmark we
consider is the case where investors receive the same signal on future ft’s, i.e., they
have incomplete but common knowledge on future fundamentals. With common
knowledge all investors receive the signal








t is independent of ft+T.
De￿ning the precision of this signal as ￿v;c ￿ 1=￿2













ft + ￿vvt + ￿
c
bbt (25)
where ￿v = ￿
(1+￿)2￿v;c=d, and ￿c
b = ￿ ￿
1+￿￿￿2
c. Here ￿2
c is the conditional variance
of next period’s exchange rate in the common knowledge model. In this case the
exchange rate is fully revealing, since by observing st investors can perfectly deduce
bt. Thus, ￿c
b is equal to the direct risk-premium e￿ect of bt given in (17).
We can now compare the connection between the exchange rate and observed
fundamentals in the two models. In the heterogeneous information model the ob-
served fundamental is ft, while in the common knowledge model it also includes vt.
We compare the R2 of a regression of the exchange rate on observed fundamentals
in the two models. From (18), the R2 in the heterogeneous information model is
de￿ned by:
R2














From (25) the R2 in the common knowledge model is de￿ned by:
R2















17If the conditional variance of the exchange rate is the same in both models the R2
is clearly lower in the heterogeneous information model. Two factors contribute to
this. First, the contribution of unobserved fundamentals to exchange rate volatility
is ampli￿ed, as measured by the magni￿cation factor z in the denominator of (26).
Second, the average signal in the heterogeneous information model, which is equal
to the future fundamental, is unobserved and therefore contributes to reducing
the R2. It also appears in the denominator of (26). In contrast, the signal about
future fundamentals is observed in the common knowledge model, and therefore
contributes to raising the R2. The variance of this signal, ￿2
f +￿2
v;c, appears in the
numerator of (27). The conditional variance of the exchange rate also contributes
to the R2. It can be higher in either model, dependent on assumptions about
parameter values and quality of the public and private signals.30
III.C Order Flow
It is straightforward to implement for this special case the general de￿nition of
order ￿ow and limit orders discussed in section II. Using (4), (18) and (20), we can


















Limit orders are captured by the ￿rst term, while order ￿ow is captured by the sum
of the last two terms. Note that the variables vi
t and bi
t in the private information
set are unpredictable by public information at the time market orders are placed.31




ft+1 ￿ bt (29)
30While we focus here on the exchange rate determination puzzle, which is about the disconnect
between exchange rates and observed fundamentals, it is easy to show that in the heterogeneous
information model the exchange rate is more disconnected from fundamentals \f" generally
(both observed and future fundamentals) than in the common knowledge model. In that case
the term ￿f￿2
f moves from the denominator to the numerator of (26). When the conditional
variance of next period’s exchange rate is the same in both models, the R2 remains lower in the
heterogeneous information model due to the ampli￿cation of unobserved hedge trades.
31In terms of the notation introduced in section II, E(Ii
tjI
p
t ) = 0.









Equation (30) shows that the exchange rate is related in a simple way to a com-
monly observed fundamental and order ￿ow. The order ￿ow term captures the
extent to which the exchange rate changes due to the aggregation of private in-
formation. The impact of order ￿ow is larger the bigger the magni￿cation factor
z. A higher level of z implies that the order ￿ow is more informative about the
future fundamental.









In that case order ￿ow is only driven by hedge trades.32 Since these trades have
no information content about future fundamentals, the impact of order ￿ow on
the exchange rate is smaller (not multiplied by the magni￿cation factor z). A
comparison between (30) and (31) clearly shows that the exchange rate is more
closely connected to order ￿ow in the heterogeneous information model and more
closely connected to public information in the common knowledge model.
IV Model Implications: Dynamics
In this section, we examine the more complex dynamic properties of the model
when T > 1. There are two important implications. First, it creates endogenous
persistence of the impact of non-observable shocks on the exchange rate. Second,
higher order expectations di￿er from ￿rst order expectations when T > 1. Even
for T = 2 expectations of in￿nite order a￿ect the exchange rate. We show that
higher order expectations tend to increase the magni￿cation e￿ect, but have an
ambiguous impact on the disconnect. We now examine these two aspects in turn.
32Note that aggregate hedge trade bt is not in the public information set at the time orders
are submitted. It is only revealed after the price is known.
19IV.A Persistence
When T > 1, even transitory non-observable shocks have a persistent e￿ect on the
exchange rate. This is due to the learning of investors who gradually realize that
the change in the exchange is not caused by a shock to future fundamentals.33 The
exchange rate at time t depends on future fundamentals ft+1, ft+2, :::,ft+T, and
therefore provides information about each of these future fundamentals. A tran-
sitory unobservable shock to bt a￿ects the exchange rate at time t and therefore
a￿ects the expectations of all future fundamentals up to time t+T. This rational
confusion will last for T periods, until the ￿nal one of these fundamentals, ft+T,
is observed. Until that time investors will continue to give weight to st in form-
ing their expectations of future fundamentals, so that bt continues to a￿ect the
exchange rate.34 As investors gradually learn more about ft+1, ft+2, :::,ft+T, both
by observing them and through new private signals and exchange rate signals, the
impact on the exchange rate of the shock to bt gradually dissipates.
The persistence of the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate is also a￿ected
by the persistence of the shock itself. When the b-shock itself becomes more
persistent, it is more di￿cult for investors to learn about fundamentals up to time
t+T from exchange rates subsequent to time t. The rational confusion is therefore
more persistent and so is the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate.
IV.B Higher Order Expectations
The topic of higher order expectations is a di￿cult one, but it has potentially
important implications for asset pricing. Since a detailed analysis falls outside the
scope of this paper, we limit ourselves to a brief discussion regarding the impact
of higher order expectations on the connection between the exchange rate and ob-
served fundamentals. We apply the results of Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a],
where we provide a general analysis of the impact of higher order expectations on
33Persistence can also arise in models with incomplete but common knowledge, such as Mussa
[1976]. When agents do not know whether an increase in an observed fundamental is transitory
or persistent, a transitory shock will have a larger and more persistent e￿ect because of gradual
learning.
34This result is related to ￿ndings by Brown and Jennings [1989] and Grundy and McNichols
[1989], who show in the context of two-period noisy rational expectations models that the asset
price in the second period is a￿ected by the asset price in the ￿rst period.
20asset prices.35 We still assume that ￿b = 0.
Let st denote the exchange rate that would prevail if the higher order expec-
tations in (7) are replaced by ￿rst order expectations.36 In Bacchetta and van
Wincoop [2004a] we show that the present value of the di￿erence between higher
and ￿rst order expectations depends on average ￿rst-order expectational errors
about average private signals. In Appendix C we show that in our context this
leads to





￿k(Etft+k ￿ ft+k) (32)
The parameters ￿k are de￿ned in the Appendix and are positive in all numeri-
cal applications. Higher order expectations therefore introduce a new asset price
component, which depends on average ￿rst-order expectational errors about future
fundamentals.
Moreover, the expectational errors Etft+k ￿ ft+k depend on errors in public
signals, i.e., observed fundamentals and exchange rates; based on private informa-
tion alone these average expectational errors would be zero. There are two types
of errors in public signals. First, there are errors in the exchange rate signals that
are caused by the unobserved hedge trades at time t and earlier. This implies that
unobserved hedge trades receive a larger weight in the equilibrium exchange rate.
The other type of errors in public signals are errors in the signals based on the
process of ft. These errors depend negatively on future innovations in the funda-
mental, which implies that the exchange rate depends less on unobserved future
fundamentals. To summarize, hedge shocks are further magni￿ed by the presence
of higher order expectations, while the overall impact on the connection between
the exchange rate and observed fundamentals is ambiguous.37
35Allen, Morris and Shin [2005] provide an insightful analysis of higher order expectations with
an asset price, but they do not consider an in￿nite horizon model.













37In Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a], we show that the main impact of higher order
expectations is to disconnect the price from the present value of future observable fundamentals.
21V Model Implications: Numerical Analysis
We now solve the model numerically to illustrate the various implications of the
model discussed above. We ￿rst consider a benchmark parameterization and then
discuss the sensitivity of the results to changing some key parameters.
V.A A Benchmark Parameterization
The parameters of the benchmark case are reported in Table 1. We assume that
the observable fundamental f follows a random walk, whose innovations have a
standard deviation of ￿f = 0:01. We assume a high standard deviation of the
private signal error of ￿v = 0:08. The unobservable fundamental b follows an
AR process with autoregressive coe￿cient of ￿b = 0:8 and a standard deviation
￿b = 0:01 of innovations. Although we have made assumptions about both ￿b
and risk-aversion ￿, they enter multiplicatively in the model, so only their product
matters. Finally, we assume T = 8, so that agents obtain private signals about
fundamentals eight periods before they are realized.
Figure 2 shows some of the key results from the benchmark parameterization.
Panels A and B show the dynamic impact on the exchange rate in response to one-
standard deviation shocks in the private and common knowledge models. In the
heterogeneous agent model, there are two shocks: a shock "
f
t+T (f-shock), which
￿rst a￿ects the exchange rate at time t, and a shock "b
t (b-shock). In the common
knowledge model there are also shocks "v
t, which a￿ect the exchange rate through
the commonly observable fundamental vt. In order to facilitate comparison, we set
the precision of the public signal such that the conditional variance of next period’s
exchange rate is the same as in the heterogeneous information model. This implies
that the unobservable hedge trades have the same risk-premium e￿ect in the two
models. We will show below that our key results do not depend on the assumed
precision of the public signal.
Magni￿cation
The magni￿cation factor in the benchmark parameterization turns out to be
substantial: 7.2. This is visualized in Figure 2 by comparing the instantaneous
response of the exchange rate to the b-shocks in the two models in panels A and
B. The only reason the impact of a b-shock is so much bigger in the heteroge-
22neous information model is the magni￿cation factor associated with information
dispersion.
Persistence
We can see from panel A that after the initial shock the impact of the b-shocks
dies down almost as a linear function of time. The half-life of the impact of the
shock is 3 periods. After 8 periods the rational confusion is resolved and the impact
is the same as in the public information model, which is close to zero.
The meaning of a 3-period half-life depends of course on what we mean by a
period in the model. What is critical is not the length of a period, but the length
of time it takes for uncertainty about future macro variables to be resolved. For
example, assume that this length of time is eight months. If a period in our model
is a month, then T = 8. If a period is three days, then T = 80. We ￿nd that
the half-life of the impact of the unobservable hedge shocks on the exchange rate
that can be generated by the model remains virtually unchanged as we change
the length of a period. For T = 8 the half life is about 3, while for T = 80 it is
about 30.38 In both cases the half-life is 3 months. Persistence is therefore driven
critically by the length of time it takes for uncertainty to resolve itself. Deviations
of the exchange rate from observed fundamentals can therefore be very long-lasting
when it takes a long time before expectations about future fundamentals can be
validated, such as expectations about the long-term technology growth rate of the
economy.
Exchange rate disconnect in the short and the long run
Panel C reports the contribution of unobserved hedge trades to the variance of
st+k￿st at di￿erent horizons. In the heterogeneous information model, 70% of the
variance of a 1-period change in the exchange rate is driven by the unobservable
hedge trades, while in the common knowledge model it is a negligible 1.3% (such
38When we change the length of a period we also need to change other model parameters,
such as the standard deviations of the shocks. In doing so we restrict parameters such that (i)
the contribution of b-shocks to var(st+1 ￿st) is the same as in the benchmark parameterization
and (ii) the impact of b-shocks on exchange rate volatility remains largely driven by information
dispersion (large magni￿cation factor). For example, when we change the benchmark parame-
terization such that T = 80, ￿v = 0:26, ￿f = 0:0016 and ￿ = 44, the half-life is 28 periods. The
magni￿cation factor is 48.
23a small e￿ect is typical of standard portfolio-balance models). While in the short-
run unobservable fundamentals dominate exchange rate volatility, in the long-run
observable fundamentals dominate. For example, the contribution of hedge trades
to the variance of exchange rate changes over a 10-period interval is less than 20%.
As seen in panel A, the impact of hedge trades on the exchange rate gradually dies
down as rational confusion dissipates over time.
In order to determine the relationship between exchange rates and observed
fundamentals, panel D reports the R2 of a regression of st+k ￿ st on all current
and lagged observed fundamentals. In the heterogeneous information model this
includes all one period changes in the fundamental f that are known at time
t + k: ft+s ￿ ft+s￿1, for s ￿ k. In the common knowledge model it also includes
the corresponding one-period changes in the public signal v. The R2 is close to
1 for all horizons in the common knowledge model, while it is much lower in the
heterogeneous information model. At the one-period horizon it is only 0.14; it then
rises as the horizon increases, to 0.8 for a 20-period horizon. This is consistent
with extensive ￿ndings that macroeconomic fundamentals have weak explanatory
power for exchange rates in the short to medium run, starting with Meese and
Rogo￿ [1983], and ￿ndings of a closer relationship over longer horizons.39
Two factors account for the results in panel D. The ￿rst is that the relative
contribution of unobservable hedge shocks to exchange rate volatility is large in
the short-run and small in the long-run, as illustrated in panel C. The second





t+T in future fundamentals that are not yet observed today. In
the long-run these become observable, again contributing to a closer relationship
between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the long-run.
Exchange rate and future fundamentals
Recently Engel and West [2005] and Froot and Ramadorai [2005] have reported
evidence that exchange rate changes predict future fundamentals, but only weakly
so. Our model is consistent with these ￿ndings. Panel E of Figure 2 reports the
R2 of a regression ft+k ￿ ft+1 on st+1 ￿ st for k ￿ 2. The R2 is positive, but is
never above 0.14. The exchange rate is a￿ected by the private signals of future
39See MacDonald and Taylor [1993], Mark [1995], Chinn and Meese [1995], Mark and Sul
[2001], Froot and Ramadorai [2005] and Gourinchas and Rey [2005].
24fundamentals, which aggregate to the future fundamentals. However, most of the
short-run volatility of exchange rates is associated with unobservable hedge trades,
which do not predict future fundamentals.
Exchange rate and order ￿ow
Order ￿ow is computed as discussed in section II.E. Appendix D discusses
further details for the case where the fundamental f is a random walk. With xt
de￿ned as cumulative order ￿ow, panel F reports the R2 of a regression of st+k￿st
on xt+k ￿ xt. The R2 is large. At a one-period horizon it is 0.84, so that 84% of
the variance of one-period exchange rate changes can be accounted for by order
￿ow as opposed to public information. The relationship between cumulative order
￿ow and exchange rates gets even stronger as the horizon k increases, with the R2
rising to 0.97 for k = 40. As k approaches in￿nity the R2 approaches a level near
0.99, so that there is a very close long-run relationship between cumulative order
￿ow and exchange rates.40
It is important to point out that the close relationship between the exchange
rate and order ￿ow in the long run is not inconsistent with the close relationship
between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the long run. When the
exchange rate rises due to private information about permanently higher future
fundamentals, the information reaches the market through order ￿ow. Eventually
the future fundamentals will be observed, so that there is a link between the
exchange rate and the observed fundamentals. But most of the information about
higher future fundamentals is aggregated into the price through order ￿ow. Order
￿ow associated with information about future fundamentals has a permanent e￿ect
on the exchange rate.
Our results can be compared to similar regressions that have been conducted
based on the data. Evans and Lyons [2002a] estimate regressions of one-day ex-
40The relationship between st+k ￿ st and xt+k ￿ xt does not always get stronger for longer
horizons. For low values of T the R2 declines with k and then converges asymptotically to
a positive level. Appendix D shows that cumulative order ￿ow and exchange rates are not
cointegrated, which explains why the R2 never approaches 1 as k approaches in￿nity. The




Shocks to the fundamental f have a permanent a￿ect on both the exchange rate and cumulative
order ￿ow. Hedge trade innovations a￿ect cumulative order ￿ow permanently, but their e￿ect
on the exchange rate dies out when hedge trade shocks are temporary (￿b < 1).
25change rate changes on daily order ￿ow. They ￿nd an R2 of 0.63 and 0.40 for
respectively the DM/$ and the yen/$ exchange rate, based on four months of daily
data in 1996. Evans and Lyons [2002b] report results for nine currencies. They
point out that exchange rate changes for any currency pair can also be a￿ected
by order ￿ow for other currency pairs. Regressing exchange rate changes on order
￿ow for all currency pairs they ￿nd an average R2 of 0.67 for their nine currencies.
The pictures for the exchange rate and cumulative order ￿ow reported in Evans
and Lyons [2002a] for the DM/$ and yen/$ suggest that the link is even stronger
over horizons longer than one day, although their data set is too short for formal
regression analysis. These pictures look very similar to their theoretical counter-
parts, which are reported in Figure 3 for four simulations of the model over 40
periods.41 The simulations con￿rm a close link between the exchange rate and
cumulative order ￿ow at both short and long horizons.
While not reported in panel F, the R2 of regressions of exchange rate changes on
order ￿ow in the public information model is close to zero. Two factors contribute
to the much closer link between order ￿ow and exchange rates in the heterogeneous
information model. First, in the heterogenous information model both private
information about future fundamentals and hedge trades contribute to order ￿ow,
while in the public information model only hedge trades contribute to order ￿ow.
Second, the impact on the exchange rate of the order ￿ow due to hedge trades is
much larger in the heterogeneous information model. The reason is that order ￿ow
is informative about future fundamentals in the heterogeneous information model.
As illustrated in section III.C, the magni￿cation factor z applied to the impact
of b-shocks on the exchange rate also applies to the impact of order ￿ow on the
exchange rate.
V.B Sensitivity to Model Parameters
In this subsection, we consider the parameter sensitivity of two key moments: the
R2 of a regression of st+1 ￿ st on observed fundamentals at t + 1 and earlier and
the R2 of a regression of st+1 ￿st on order ￿ow xt+1 ￿xt. These are the moments
reported for k = 1 in panels D and F of Figure 2.
41Both the log of the exchange rate and cumulative order ￿ow are set at zero at the start of
the simulation.
26A ￿rst issue is that the precision of the public signal in the common knowledge
model does not play an important role in the comparison with the heterogeneous
information model. In particular, it has little in￿uence on the stark di￿erence
between the two models regarding the connection between the exchange rate and
observed fundamentals. Consider the R2 of a regression of a one-period change in
the exchange rate on all current and past observed fundamentals, as reported in
Figure 2D. In the heterogeneous information model it is 0.14, while in the public
information model it varies from 0.97 to 0.99 as we change the variance of the noise
in the public signal from in￿nity to zero.42
We now consider sensitivity analysis to four key model parameters in the het-
erogeneous information model: ￿v, ￿b, ￿b and T. The results are reported in Figure
4. Not surprisingly, the two R2’s are almost inversely related as we vary parame-
ters. The larger the impact of order ￿ow as a channel through which information
is transmitted to the market, the smaller is the explanatory power of commonly
observed macro fundamentals.43
An increase in ￿v, implying less precise private information, reduces the link
between the exchange rate and order ￿ow and increases the link between the ex-
change rate and observed fundamentals. In the limit as the noise in private signals
approaches in￿nity, the heterogeneous information model approaches the public
information model (with uninformative signals).
Somewhat surprisingly, an increase in the noise originating from hedge trades,
by either raising the standard deviation ￿b or the persistence ￿b, tends to strengthen
the link between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals and reduce the
link between the exchange rate and order ￿ow. However, the e￿ect is relatively
small due to o￿setting factors. Order ￿ow becomes less informative about future
fundamentals with more noisy hedge trades. This reduces the impact of order ￿ow
on the exchange rate. On the other hand, the volatility of order ￿ow increases,
42In Figure 2, we have assumed that the precision of the public signal is such that the con-
ditional variance of the exchange rate is the same in the two models. This implies a standard
deviation of the error in the public signal of 0.033.
43The two lines do not add to one. The reason is that some variables that are common
knowledge are not included in the regression on observed fundamentals. These are past exchange
rates and hedge demand T periods ago. Past exchange rates are not included since they are not
traditional fundamentals. Hedge demand T periods ago can be indirectly derived from exchange
rates T periods ago and earlier, but is not a directly observable fundamental.
27which contributes positively to the R2 for order ￿ow. The former e￿ect slightly
dominates.
It is also worthwhile pointing out that the assumed stationarity of hedge trades
in the benchmark parameterization is not responsible for the much weaker rela-
tionship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals in the short-run
than the long-run. Even if we assume ￿b = 1, so that unobserved aggregate hedge
trades follow a random walk as well, this ￿nding remains largely unaltered. The
R2 for observed fundamentals rises from 0.21 for a 1-period horizon to 0.85 for a
40-period horizon.
The ￿nal panel of Figure 4 shows the impact of changing T. Initially, an
increase in T leads to a closer link between order ￿ow and the exchange rate and
a weaker link between observed fundamentals and the exchange rate. The reason
is that as T increases the quality of private information improves because agents
have signals about fundamentals further into the future. This implies that the
impact of order ￿ow on the exchange rate increases. Moreover, order ￿ow itself
also becomes more volatile as more private information is aggregated. However,
beyond a certain level of T, the link between the exchange rate and order ￿ow
is weakened when T is raised further. The reason is that the improved quality
of information reduces the conditional variance ￿2 of next period’s exchange rate.
This reduces the e￿ect of order ￿ow on the exchange rate, as can be seen from
(30).
VI Conclusion
The close relationship between order ￿ow and exchange rates, as well as the large
volume of trade in the foreign exchange market, suggest that investor heterogeneity
is key to understanding exchange rate dynamics. In this paper we have explored
the implications of information dispersion in a simple model of exchange rate de-
termination. We have shown that these implications are rich and that investors’
heterogeneity can be an important element in explaining the behavior of exchange
rates. In particular, the model can account for some important stylized facts on
the relationship between exchange rates, fundamentals and order ￿ow: (i) fun-
damentals have little explanatory power for short to medium run exchange rate
movements, (ii) over long horizons the exchange rate is closely related to observed
28fundamentals, (iii) exchange rate changes are a weak predictor of future funda-
mentals, and (iv) the exchange rate is closely related to order ￿ow.
The paper should be considered only as a ￿rst step in a promising line of
research. While we have mostly focused on the implications of the model for the
relationship between exchange rates, fundamentals and order ￿ow, future work
along this line should also consider the implications for other outstanding exchange
rate puzzles such as the forward discount puzzle and excess volatility puzzle.44
More broadly speaking, a natural next step is to confront the model to the data.
While the extent of information dispersion and unobservable hedge trades are not
known, they both a￿ect order ￿ow. Some limited data on order ￿ow are now
available and will help tie down the key model parameters. The magni￿cation
factor may be quite large. Back-of-the-envelope calculations by Gennotte and
Leland [1990] in the context of a static model for the U.S. stock market crash of
October 1987 suggest that the impact of a $6 billion unobserved supply shock was
magni￿ed by a factor 250 due to rational confusion about the source of the stock
price decline. In the context of foreign exchange markets, Osler [2005] presents
evidence that trades which are uninformative about future fundamentals have a
large impact on the price.
There are several directions in which the model can be extended. The ￿rst is
to explicitly model nominal rigidities as in the \new open economy macro" litera-
ture. In that literature exchange rates are entirely driven by commonly observed
macro fundamentals. Conclusions that have been drawn about optimal monetary
and exchange rate policies are likely to be substantially revised when introducing
investor heterogeneity. Another direction is to consider alternative information
structures. For example, the information received by agents may di￿er in its qual-
ity or in its timing. There can also be heterogeneity about the knowledge of the
underlying model. For example, in Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004b], we show
that if investors receive private signals about the persistence of shocks, the impact
of observed variables on the exchange rate varies over time. The rapidly grow-
44See Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2003] for some discussion of the excess volatility puzzle
in the context of this model. The current model yields a forward discount bias of the correct
sign, but the magnitude falls short of what is found in empirical evidence. See Bacchetta and
van Wincoop [2005] for an explanation of the bias based on a di￿erent type of information
heterogeneity.
29ing body of empirical work on order ￿ow in the foreign exchange microstructure
literature is likely to increase our understanding of the nature of the information
structure, providing guidance to future modeling.
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A Derivation of equation (7)





























































Continuing to solve for st this way by forward induction and assuming a no-bubble
solution yields (7).
B Solution method with two-period overlapping
investors
The solution method is related to Townsend (1983, section VIII). We start with the
conjectured equation (11) for st and check whether it is consistent with the model,
in particular with equation (6). For this, we need to estimate the conditional
moments of st+1 and express them as a function of the model’s innovations. Finally
we equate the parameters from the resulting equation to the initially conjectured
equation.
B.1 The exchange rate equation
From (1)-(3), and the de￿nition of ft, it is easy to see that i￿
t ￿ it = (ft ￿ st)=￿.













31We want to express (36) in terms of current and past innovations. First, we
have ft = D(L)"
f
t. Second, using (5) we can write bt = C(L)"b
t, where C(L) =
1 + ￿bL + ￿2
bL2 + :::. What remains to be computed are E(st+1) and ￿2.
Applying (11) to st+1, writing A(L) = a1 + a2L + a3L2 + ::: and B(L) =





















t￿T+1) represents the vector of unobservable in-
novations, ￿
0 = (a2;a3;:::;aT+1;b2;:::;bT+1) and A￿(L) = aT+2 + aT+3L + :::(with
a similar de￿nition for B￿(L)). Thus, we have (since "
f
j and "b

























We need to estimate the conditional expectation and variance of the unobserv-
able ￿t as a function of past innovations.
B.2 Conditional moments
We follow the strategy of Townsend (1983, p.556), but use the notation of Hamilton
[1994, chapter 13]. First, to focus on the informational content of observable
variables, we subtract the known components from the observables st and vi
t and
de￿ne these new variables as s￿
t and vi￿











. This vector provides information on the

























a1 a2 ::: aT b1 b2 ::: bT
0 a1 ::: aT￿1 0 b1 ::: bT￿1
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 ::: a1 0 0 ::: b1
d1 d2 ::: dT 0 0 ::: 0
0 d1 ::: dT￿1 0 0 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::














32The unconditional means of ￿t and wi
t are zero. De￿ne their unconditional










0 e PH + R
i￿1
(42)
Moreover, P ￿ vart(￿t) is given by:
P=e P ￿ MH
0 e P (43)
B.3 Solution
First, ￿2 can easily be derived from (39) and (43). Second, substituting (41) and











We can then substitute Et(st+1) and ￿2 into ( 36) so that we have an expression
for st that has the same form as (11). We then need to solve a ￿xed point problem.
Although A(L)and B(L) are in￿nite lag operators, we only need to solve a ￿-
nitely dimensional ￿xed point problem in the set of parameters (a1;a2;:::;aT;b1;:::;bT+1).
This can be seen as follows. First, it is easily veri￿ed by equating the parameters
of the conjectured and equilibrium exchange rate equation for lags T and greater
that bT+s+1 = 1+￿
￿ bT+s + ￿￿2￿
T+s￿1
b and aT+s+1 = 1+￿
￿ aT+s ￿ 1
￿ds for s ￿ 1. As-
suming non-explosive coe￿cients, the solutions to these di￿erence equations give
us the coe￿cients for lags T + 1 and greater: bT+1 = ￿￿￿￿2￿T
b =(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿￿b),
bT+s = (￿b)s￿1bT+1 for s ￿ 2, aT+1 = (1=￿)
P1
s=1(￿=(1 + ￿))sds, and aT+s+1 =
1+￿
￿ aT+s￿ 1
￿ds for s ￿ 1. When the fundamental follows a random walk, ds = 1 8 s,
so that aT+s = 1 8 s ￿ 1.
The ￿xed point problem in the parameters (a1;a2;:::;aT;b1;:::;bT+1) consists of
2T +1 equations. One of them is the bT+1 = ￿￿￿￿2￿T
b =(1+￿￿￿￿b). The other 2T
equations equate the parameters of the conjectured and equilibrium exchange rate
equations up to lag T ￿ 1. The conjectured parameters (a1;a2;:::;aT;b1;:::;bT+1),
together with the solution for aT+1 above allow us to compute ￿, H, M and ￿2,
33and therefore the parameters of the equilibrium exchange rate equation. We use
the Gauss NLSYS routine to solve the 2T + 1 non-linear equations.
After having found the solution, we can also verify that the polynomial B(L) is
invertible, which is necessary to extract information about hedge trade innovations
at t ￿ T and earlier from exchange rates at t ￿ T and earlier. Using that bT+s =




















B(L) is invertible when the roots of the polynomial are outside the unit circle.





i = 0 (46)
This amounts to solving the roots of an ordinary T-order polynomial, which is
done with the routine polyroot in Gauss. The roots are indeed outside the unit
circle for all parameterizations considered in the paper. For the benchmark para-
meterization the roots are (rounding to the second digit after the decimal point):
(￿1:43;￿1:03+0:98i;￿1:03￿0:98i;￿0:07+1:39i;￿0:07￿1:39i;0:89+0:98i;0:89￿
0:98i;1:28).
C Higher Order Expectations
We show how (32) follows from Proposition 1 in Bacchetta and van Wincoop
[2004a]. Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a] de￿ne the higher order wedge ￿t as
the present value of deviations between higher order and ￿rst order expectations.



















ft+s as the present discounted value of future ob-
served fundamentals. Let Vi
t be the set of private signals available at time t that




34Let Vt denote the average across investors of the vector Vi
t. Proposition 1 of
Bacchetta and van Wincoop [2004a] then says that
￿t = ￿
0
t(Et ￿ Vt ￿ ￿ Vt) (48)
where ￿t = 1
R2(I ￿ ￿)￿1￿, ￿
0 = @Ei
t+1PVt+1=@Vi
t and ￿0 = @Ei
t+1 ￿ Vt+1=@Vi
t.
In our context Vt = (ft+2;::;ft+T). For ￿b = 0 equations (7), (47) and (48)
then lead to (32) with ￿=(1 + ￿) = (￿2;::;￿T)0.
D Order Flow
In this section we describe our measure of order ￿ow when the observable funda-














where n = ￿￿￿2￿
T+1
b =(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿￿b). Let ￿ = (￿1;::;￿t)0 be the last T elements
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t+1￿s+T + ￿vi





where ￿0 = (￿1;::;￿2T) with ￿s = ￿1 + :: + ￿s and ￿T+s = ￿￿
s￿1
b for s = 1;::;T.
Order ￿ow xt ￿ xt￿1 is de￿ned as the component of (51) that is orthogonal to
public information (other than st). Public information that helps predict this term
includes bt￿T and s￿
t￿1;::;s￿
t￿T+1. Order ￿ow is then the error term of a regression
of ￿0￿t on s￿
t￿1;::;s￿
t￿T+1. De￿ning Hs as rows 2 to T of the matrix H de￿ned in










. It follows that




We can also show that there is a cointegrating relationship between the ex-
change rate, cumulative order ￿ow and ^ bt =
P1
s=0 ￿b
t￿T￿s. When f follows a random
35walk, the equilibrium exchange rate can be written as (see Appendix B.3)
st = ft ￿ ￿bt￿T + ￿
0￿t (53)
Order ￿ow is equal to
xt ￿ xt￿1 = ￿
0￿t (54)
where ￿0 = ￿0(I ￿ MsH0
s). It therefore follows that cumulative order ￿ow is equal
to
xt = (￿1 + :: + ￿T)ft + (￿T+1 + :: + ￿2T)^ bt +  
0￿t (55)
where   depends on the parameters in the vector ￿. It follows from (53) and (55)
that there is a cointegrating relationship between st, xt and ^ bt. Note that the latter
follows a random walk since ^ bt￿^ bt￿1 = ￿b
t￿T. This cointegrating relationship holds
both for ￿b < 1 and ￿b = 1. In the latter case bt￿T = ^ bt.
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*This figure is based on the simulation of the model for T=1, with both btand ft i.i.d.. The qualitative results do not depend on other model parameters. 
We set α=10, γ=50, and all standard deviations of the shocks equal to 0.1, unless varied within the Figure.
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* Order flow: R2 of regression of st+1-st on xt+1-xt (same as Figure 2F for k=1). Observed fundamentals: R2 of regression st+1-ston all ft+s-
ft+s-1 for s²1 (same as Figure 2D for k=1). The figures show how the explanatory power of order flow and observed fundamentals 
changes when respectively σv,σb, T and ρb are varied, holding constant the other parameters as in the benchmark parameterization.The FAME Research Paper Series 
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tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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